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OMNISCIENCE, TENSED FACTS, 
AND DIVINE ETERNITY 
William Lane Craig 
A difficulty for a view of divine eternity as timelessness is that if time is 
tensed, then God, in virtue of His omniscience, must know tensed facts. But 
tensed facts, such as It is now t, can only be known by a temporally located 
being. 
Defenders of divine atemporality may attempt to escape the force of this 
argument by contending either that a timeless being can know tensed facts or 
else that ignorance of tensed facts is compatible with divine omniscience. 
Kvanvig, Wierenga, and Leftow adopt both of these strategies in their various 
defenses of divine timelessness. Their respective solutions are analyzed in 
detail and shown to be untenable. 
Thus, if the theist holds to a tensed view of time, he should construe divine 
eternity in terms of omnitemporality. 
Introduction 
Many theists in the Western tradition have held that God is timeless, and 
recently this doctrine has enjoyed something of a resurgence.1 The objec-
tive reality of tense remains, however, problematic for the doctrine of 
divine atemporality. For if an A-Theory of time (in McTaggart's terminolo-
gy) is correct, there exist tensed facts, of which God, as an omniscient 
being, cannot be ignorant. But since tensed facts can only be known by a 
temporal being, God must therefore be temporal. 
The objection, then, is that 
1. God is timeless. 
2. God is omniscient. 
and 
3. A temporal world exists. 
are broadly logically inconsistent, as is evident from the necessary truth of 
4. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows 
tensed facts. 
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5. If God is timeless, He does not know tensed facts. 
Since (2) is essential to theism and (3) is evidently true, (1) must be false. 
The B-theorist escapes this argument by denying that there are any 
tensed facts, so that (4) is false. The B-theorist holds that God knows all the 
facts there are about the temporal world in knowing tenseless facts. Thus, 
if one embraces a tenseless theory of time, he eludes the objector's snare. 
Most defenders of divine timelessness, however, are eager to free their 
doctrine from dependency on the B-Theory. The question, then, is how 
one may affirm the reality of tensed facts and yet maintain either that God 
knows them or that His ignorance of them does not impugn His omni-
science. 
Timeless Knowledge of Tensed Facts 
Some atemporalists have attempted to argue that God does know tensed 
facts, thus denying the truth of (5). For example, Jonathan Kvanvig holds 
both to the objective reality of tensed facts and to God's timeless knowl-
edge of all facts, which together imply that God has timeless knowledge of 
tensed facts. Kvanvig's defense of this position relies upon his analysis of 
propositions expressed by sentences containing personal indexicals.2 In 
lieu of positing privately accessible propositions, he analyzes belief in 
terms of a triadic relation between an intentional attitude, a proposition, 
and a particular manner of accessing, or grasping, the proposition. 
Personal indexicals express individual essences, which are part of the 
propositional content of the sentence containing such indexical words. But 
this propositional content is differently accessed by different persons. 
When Kvanvig says, "I'm Kvanvig," he expresses the same proposition as I 
do when I say to him, "You're Kvanvig," but this propositional content is 
directly grasped by Kvanvig and indirectly grasped by me. Kvanvig sug-
gests that the proposition is grasped through the meanings of the sentences 
involved; since these are different/ the propositional content is differently 
accessed by Kvanvig and me. Thus, an omniscient God has the same 
knowledge of the facts as we do with respect to the propositions we 
express through sentences containing personal indexicals, but we directly 
access those propositions involving our respective individual essences, 
while God accesses this same propositional content indirectly. 
Kvanvig proposes an analogous solution for dealing with tensed facts 
expressed by sentences like "It is now 1 June 1984." He asserts that the 
demonstrative "now" expresses the individual essence of the time to which 
it refers. He maintains that "temporal demonstratives are just particular 
ways of referring to the essences of moments."4 Such an interpretation of 
temporal indexicals permits us to hold that God grasps the same proposi-
tional content that we do when we use sentences like "It is now 1 June 
1984." On Kvanvig's view the same proposition is expressed by the sen-
tence "Today is 1 June 1984" uttered on that date as is expressed by the 
sentence "Yesterday was 1 June 1984" uttered on June 2. The difference in 
behavior resulting from these two beliefs is due to the meanings of the sen-
tences through which the identical propositional content is accessed. A 
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person grasps a proposition containing the essence of a time directly only if 
that person grasps the proposition at that time, which issues in a present-
tense belief; otherwise the proposition is grasped indirectly, which in the 
case of temporal persons will yield beliefs involving other tenses. Hence, 
/I one can affirm the doctrines of timelessness, immutability and omni-
science by affirming that God indirectly grasps every temporal moment, 
and directly grasps none of them."s 
At face value, Kvanvig's analysis would not seem to be a defense of 
God's timeless knowledge of tensed facts, but the claim that tense in some 
way derives from the manner of accessing propositional content, which 
itself is tenseless. For the essences of the times picked out by temporal 
indexicals do not include their tensed properties (for example, present-
ness), or it becomes inexplicable how indexical expressions like "today" 
and "yesterday" could refer to the same individual essence and how God 
could timelessly grasp propositional content involving such essences. But 
Kvanvig denies that there is any temporal element expressed by tensed 
sentences which is not part of their propositional content. Referring to 
what he calls the "proposition" 
1. It is now 1 June 1984. 
and 
1A. The essence of the moment picked out by the use of the demon-
strative 'now' in (1) is mutually exemplified with the property of 
being 1 June 1984. 
Kvanvig asserts, 
... the apparent infection of propositions such as (1) by temporality is 
eliminated by noting that (lA) lacks this temporality and further con-
tains all the same temporal elements as (1). If (lA) is not identical to 
(I), it is not because of some temporal dimension; it must be for some 
other reason.6 
It is odd that Kvanvig refers to his (1) as a proposition, for on his own view 
propositions lack indexicality. Rather (1) is a sentence, and the question is 
whether the proposition expressed by (1) is infected by temporality, that is 
to say, whether that proposition is such that it cannot be expressed "with-
out implying temporal indexicals."7 Kvanvig's claim is that the proposi-
tional content of (1) can be expressed by sentences not implying temporal 
indexicals. His reason for this claim is that (lA) is not so infected (either it 
expresses the same proposition as (1) without the use of temporal indexi-
cals or else it represents the propositional content of (1) and can be 
expressed other than by (1) through a sentence not implying temporal 
indexicals) and, moreover, contains all the same temporal elements as (1). But 
(lA) is true only if the "is" in (lA) is tenseless. Otherwise (lA) is false, hav-
ing been true only on 1 June 1984. If (lA) is tensed, the time of its truth is 
just the same as that of (1). Thus Kvanvig errs when he says that if (lA) is 
228 Faith and Philosophy 
not identical to (1) it is not because of some temporal element--on the con-
trary, it is precisely because of the absence of tense from (lA) that it is not 
identical to (1). If all the temporal elements of (1) are contained in (lA) and 
God's knowledge is of propositions expressible by sentences like (lA), then 
God knows no tensed facts nor, indeed, is tense any objective temporal ele-
ment at all, either of the propositional content of (1) or of the way of access-
ing that propositional content. Tense is merely a feature of language and 
nothing more. Kvanvig's analysis thus miscarries: it implies that the 
propositional content of tensed sentences is tenseless and that such sen-
tences imply no temporal element not described by their propositional con-
tent, which in tum implies the non-objectivity of tense.8 
A somewhat similar, but crucially adjusted, account of divine omni-
science is offered by Edward Wierenga, who considers tense to belong to 
the propositional content expressed by tensed sentences, so that God must, 
in virtue of His omniscience, know tensed facts. 9 In order to explain why 
such knowledge does not involve God in temporality, Wierenga appeals, 
like Kvanvig, to the analogy of propositions expressed by sentences con-
taining first-person pronouns. lO Adopting Plantinga's notion of an individ-
ual essence-a property which something can possess essentially and no 
other thing can possess at all-, Wierenga asserts that we should hold one 
of a person's essences to be special, namely, the one expressed by that per-
son's use of the word "1." In my case this essence is the property of being 
me. Wierenga calls this special essence one's haecceity, and he claims that 
propositions expressed by sentences involving the first person pronoun 
entail the haecceity of the person using such expressions; such propositions 
he calls "first person propositions." Now Wierenga does not think that I am 
the only person who can grasp a proposition entailing my haecceity. Rather 
what is crucial is that I cannot believe such a proposition without having a 
de se belief, that is, a belief about me myself. A person 5 believes de se that 
he himself is F just in case there is a haecceity E such that 5 has E and 5 
believes a proposition having E as a constituent and which attributes being F 
to whomever has E. Being omniscient, God also believes those propositions 
which have my haecceity as a constituent, but since the haecceity is mine, 
not God's, His believing them does not issue in de se beliefs for Him, as my 
believing them does for me. 
On the analogy of personal haecceities, Wierenga asserts that moments of 
time also have special essences or haecceities. A proposition containing the 
haecceity of a time he calls a "present-time proposition." We temporal 
beings can only grasp present-time propositions at the time whose haecceity 
is contained in the proposition, not before or after. When a person believes a 
present-time proposition at its time, that person has a de praesenti belief. A 
person 5 believes de praesenti at a time t that it is then the case that p just in 
case there is a haecceity T such that t has T and at t 5 believes a proposition 
having T as a constituent and which attributes being such that p to whatever 
time has T. Wierenga analyzes the proposition expressed by A. N. Prior's 
liThe 1960 exams are over" as a proposition entailing the conjunction of the 
haecceity of the time of Prior's belief and the property of being such that the 
1960 exams have finished bifore then. 
Now Wierenga contends that there is no reason why God cannot believe 
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all true present-time propositions, just as He believes all true first-person 
propositions. Just as His belief in a first-person proposition does not give 
Him a belief de se unless it is a belief in His own first-person proposition, so 
a belief in a present-time proposition does not give Him belief de praesenti 
unless He believes that proposition at its time. Being timeless, God did not 
have to wait, as did Prior, until August 29, 1960, in order to grasp the 
proposition Prior expressed by saying, "The 1960 exams are over." He 
grasps and believes the relevant proposition timelessly and so forms no de 
praesenti belief in so doing. Thus, a timeless God knows all present-time 
propositions, and so there are no tensed facts unknown to Him. 
It seems to me that Wierenga's account of God's knowledge of proposi-
tions expressed by tensed discourse is multiply defective. To begin with, 
his account of what it is to have a de praesenti belief is implausible. Suppose 
I glance out the window and form the judgment, "It's raining. II On 
Wierenga's account, what I actually believe is a proposition about a certain 
time which attributes to that time a peculiar property, being such that it is 
raining then. But surely I do not believe anything of the sortY I may be 
utterly unconscious of the present time and certainly am not forming beliefs 
about its properties or its haecceity. Whatever plausibility attends 
Wierenga's analysis of de se beliefs derives from the fact that expression of 
such beliefs in English involves the use of first-person indexicals, so that S 
can be conceived to believe a proposition involving S's haecceity and a 
property F. But the temporal analogue to such beliefs de se are beliefs 
involving present-tense indexicals like "now." When we have beliefs about 
what is going on now, then we do plausibly fOID1 a belief involving in some 
way the relevant time. Wierenga's analysis would most plausibly account 
for beliefs having similar fOID1 to a belief like "Now is when the meeting 
starts." In such a case we do seem to be ascribing a property to a tensed 
time. But not all beliefs de praesenti involve temporal indexicals, and the 
range of those doing so which also ascribe properties to the present is nar-
row, indeed. Wierenga might attempt to adjust his analysis, such that in 
having a belief de praesenti I grasp (even if I do not believe) a proposition 
such as he describesY But if through my tensed beliefs I grasp information 
which essentially involves a certain time and its properties, why is there no 
necessary reference to that time in my conscious belief in the form of tempo-
ral indexicals like "now"? Just as first-person propositions must be 
expressed in English via first-person indexicals, so present-time proposi-
tions, as Wierenga conceives them, must seemingly be expressed via pre-
sent-tense indexicals. The absence of temporal indexicals from most of our 
tensed beliefs renders implausible the idea that by means of them we grasp 
propositions which involve essentially the ascription of properties to a time. 
Moreover, Wierenga's analysis of tensed beliefs is drastically incomplete, 
since it overlooks all but present-tense beliefs. How are beliefs like "John 
left at 8:00" or "John will come home at 3:00" to be analyzed? It seems that 
Wierenga's analysis would require him to say that such beliefs express a 
proposition involving the haecceity of the time at which the belief is held 
and which attributes to that time properties specifying certain B-relations to 
events, for example, the time in question is such that John's leaving at 8:00 is 
earlier than then and his coming home at 3:00 is later than them. This 
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analysis serves to bring out that the property attributed to the time must be 
tenseless, not only in past- and fuhlre-tense beliefs, but also in beliefs de 
praesenti, lest the propositional content of God's beliefs be constitutive of a 
past, present, and future for God. If God is to know tensed facts, then, such 
knowledge comes, not through the property being such that p which is attrib-
uted to the time, but through the haecceity which the relevant time has. 
Does the haecceity of any time t, then, include its tense? If not, then the 
propositional content of God's beliefs is wholly tenseless, and all He grasps 
are the tenseless B-relations between times and events. Indeed, it might be 
argued that a time's haecceity cannot include its tense, since specific tense 
determinations are accidental to times. A haecceity is an individual 
essence; but since times are not essentially present, but acquire and lose 
presentness, their particular tense determinations cannot be part of their 
respective haecceities. Thus, the haecceity of a time must be a wholly 
tenseless property. Since the attribution to a tenseless time of a property 
involving tenseless B-relations of earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than 
does not serve to introduce tense, it turns out that what God knows are 
wholly tenseless propositions, not present-time propositions. 
Wierenga could escape this conclusion by advocating an ontology of 
presentism, according to which past and fuhlre times do not exist. Since 
the only time that exists is the present time, presentness could be conceived 
to be essential to any time. Just as existence is essential to any thing, since a 
thing has existence in every possible world in which it exists, \3 so present-
ness is essential to any time, since a time has presentness at every time at 
which it exists. Since a time cannot exist without being present, present-
ness therefore belongs to its haecceity. 
The analogy with first-person propositions dearly suggests that for 
Wierenga a time's haecceity involves its tense, indeed, its presentness. Just 
as first-person propositions are exactly those which entail one's haecceity, 
so present-time propositions are just those containing a time's haecceity. 
But then it becomes extraordinarily difficult to understand how God can 
grasp the haecceity of a time without that time's being present for Him, 
which entails God's temporality. Consider the analogy of first-person 
indexicals. If the individual essence which is my haecceity is not the prop-
erty of being William Craig, but, as Wierenga maintains, the special property 
of being me, then how can God possibly grasp a proposition which includes 
this haecceity?14 Such a proposition is a private proposition which God can-
not grasp because He is not I. If He can grasp such a proposition, then I fail 
to see why someone who addresses me as "you" does not also grasp such a 
proposition-in which case we are not talking about first-person proposi-
tions at all. Analogously, if a haecceity involves more than a tenseless B-
determination, if it involves being present, then a timeless God cannot grasp 
a proposition containing such a haecceity. To grasp a proposition attribut-
ing a B-relation to some time which is objectively present entails one's being 
present. For example, in order to know the tensed fact expressed by Prior's 
utterance, liThe 1960 exams are over," God must know more than the tense-
less fact that the close of the exams is earlier than August 29, 1960; he must 
know of August 29, 1960 that it is present, or past in relation to the present. 
God's having such knowledge entails His temporality. 
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Wierenga's analysis fails to explain how God can grasp propositions 
involving haecceities which include the property of presentness without 
His being temporal. It therefore also fails as a defense of a timeless God's 
knowledge of tensed facts. 
Finally, consider Brian Leftow's defense of God's timeless knowledge of 
tensed facts. The key to Leftow's solution is his distinction, inspired by the 
Special Theory of Relativity, between events' occurrence relative to various 
temporal reference frames and their occurrence relative to God's "reference 
frame" of eternity. Relative to eternity, all events are eternally present, 
even though relative to various temporal reference frames they may be 
past, present, or future respectively. Thus, relative to eternity there simply 
are no temporally tensed facts to be known. Leftowexplains, 
... all events are actual at once, in eternity. But it does not follow that 
time is not tensed. Events also occur in temporal reference frames, and 
the time of these reference frames may be tensed .... The reason a 
timeless God does not know the essentially tensed fact that (T) is that 
in His framework of reference, eternity, this is not a fact at all. (T), again, 
is the claim that a proper subset S of the set of temporal events, consist-
ing of a, b, c, etc., now has present-actuality. In eternity this claim is 
false. In eternity all temporal events ... have present-actuality at once.IS 
By (T) Leftow apparently means that the members of 5, rather than 5 itself, 
now have present-actuality. But how is this claim false in eternity? Since 
all events have present-actuality in eternity, would not also the members of 
S? Perhaps the problem is that all events have present-actuality at once in 
eternity, whereas (T) states that the members of 5 have present-actuality 
now. But in eternity, the indexical"now" in (T) refers either to the eternal 
present or to the time of a, b, c. If it refers to the eternal present, then the 
members of 5 do have present-actuality along with all other events. If it 
refers to the lime of a, b, c, then it remains in Leftow's view a fact in eterni-
ty that a, b, c have present-actuality then. So the problem does not reside 
in the contrast between now / at once. Perhaps the problem is that the pre-
sent-actuality which a, b, c now have is temporal present-actuality, where-
as in eternity they have eternal present-actuality. While this might seem to 
make sense, it sits ill with Leftow's insistence that 
The same events that A-occur in our temporal present A-occur in 
God's eternal present. They are there 'in their presentness': the very 
A-occurrence that is B-simultaneous with certain events within tem-
poral reference frames is A-simultaneous with a timeless being's exis-
tence and with all temporal events within an eternal reference frame. 
Thus God can timelessly perceive, all at once, the very A-occurring 
that we perceive sequentially, under the form of change.16 
Since, on Leftow's definitions, to A-occur is to occur now,17 we face the 
same indexical difficulty as above. If an event A-occurs in eternity, the 
"now" refers either to the eternal present or to the temporal present. If it 
refers to the eternal present, then it is not lithe very A-occurring that we 
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perceive," since that occurring refers to the temporal now. But if we say 
that it refers to the temporal present, then since the very same A-occurring 
takes place in time and eternity, (T) is a fact in eternity after all. In order to 
bring consistency into his account, it seems to me that Leftow ought to say 
that for an event to A-occur is for that event to be present and that while 
the same events exist in time and eternity, they are not present in the same 
way with respect to these two "frames": events are temporally present 
only in time and eternally present only in eternity. Therefore, in eternity 
there are no temporally tensed facts; there are only eternally tensed facts, 
and these are all in the eternal present-tense. Accordingly, (T), referring as 
it does to the temporal present, is false in eternity, but it is also false that 
the very same A-occurring that transpires in time takes place in eternity. 
It might be thought that by (T) Leftow actually means 
T'. Only the members of a proper subset S of all temporal events 
have present actuality, 
a claim which is true in time, but false in eternity, since in eternity all 
events have present actuality. But if by "present actuality" we mean, not 
merely tenseless metaphysical presence (which affords no knowledge of 
tensed facts), but present-tense actuality, then it is clear that in atemporal 
eternity events are not actual in that mode, for then eternity would be tem-
poraU8 Such an interpretation would also be inconsistent with Leftow's 
claim that in eternity God is presented with B-series of events relative to 
inertial frames.19 In any case, such present-tense actuality would leave God 
completely in the dark as to past- and future-tensed facts; indeed, in hav-
ing all events present to Him, God would either mistakenly believe that all 
events are present or else be ignorant of which subclass of events really is 
present and so have no knowledge of tensed facts. 
Leftow's account thus seems to deny, not grant, God knowledge of 
(temporally) tensed facts. All He knows are the eternal present-tense facts. 
But Leftow maintains that God also knows the essentially tensed facts rela-
tive to temporal frames of reference. He writes, 
A factually omniscient being can only be required to grasp directly 
such facts as are genuinely facts within that being's framework of ref-
erence. Thus the fact that a timeless being grasps directly only the 
essentially tensed facts of eternity does not count against His strict 
factual omniscience, provided that He has some other access to the 
essentially tensed facts of other reference frames. But ... a timeless 
God can know all the facts of simultaneity that obtain in other refer-
ence frames. Thus He can know what the essentially tensed facts of 
these other frames are, though He cannot be directly presented with 
these facts: it is just not true that the only way God can know facts is 
by some sort of direct presentation.20 
Leftow's appeal to the distinction between direct and indirect grasping will 
not serve to provide God with a knowledge of tensed facts, however. At best 
God can know what are the simultaneity classes of events relative to any arbi-
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trarily specified reference frame or hypothetical observer, but He cannot know 
what point on the world line of that observer or which simultaneity class of 
events is present in that frame.2l When we realize that the "eternal present" is 
just a metaphorical description of a tenseless state of existence, then it is evi-
dent that on Leftow's account God knows no tensed facts. At the very least 
He knows no temporally tensed facts, which is what was to be proved. 
Indeed, Leftow's account of what he calls "factual omniscience" implies 
that there really are no tensed facts.22 According to Leftow a fact is either the 
existing of a subject or a subject's exemplifying of an attribute. The same fact 
can render a number of distinct propositions true. In Leftow's view the same 
fact that renders It is then (i.e., at 3 P.M.) 3 P.M. true also renders true what is 
expressed by the sentence token "It is now 3 P.M." These are distinct truths, 
different propositions, rendered true by the same fact. That fact is accessible 
at all times in varying ways and the various modes of access one can have to 
this fact generate distinctive truths that can only be known at various times. 
So even if God cannot be propositionally omniscient concerning events in 
time, He can still be factually omniscient in regard to them. 
The above account makes it evident that Leftow is really a B-theorist in 
spite of himself, holding that there are no tensed facts. On his account a 
tensed fact would be a subject's exemplifying a tensed property like pre-
sentness or the subject's presently existing. But such a fact is not accessible 
at all times, but only at the time it obtains or exists. The proposition that It 
is then 3 P.M. does not serve to access such a present-tensed fact, for we do 
not know by it whether 3 P.M. is past, present, or future. The fact that ren-
ders such a proposition true must therefore be tenseless, even if that tense-
less fact generates a tensed proposition at 3 P.M. Since there are no facts 
that escape God's omniscience and the only temporal facts God knows are 
tenseless facts, it follows that tensed facts do not exist. 
Moreover, Leftow's account of God's factual omniscience seems unten-
able. For Leftow does not think that the propositional context expressed 
by tensed sentences is tenseless and that tense results from the mode of 
presentation to or access by language users. Rather he holds that there are 
tensed propositions which can be known only at certain times. But unless 
Leftow is prepared to reject a view of truth as correspondence, there must 
be facts corresponding to true tensed propositions, for example, that 3 P.M. 
is present. If this proposition is true, then it states a fact about the world. 
Even if we agree with Leftow that there are facts which are stated by no 
proposition, he has not given us any reason to doubt that every true propo-
sition states a fact. Indeed, a view of truth as correspondence seems to 
require it. It follows, therefore, that a timeless God is not only not proposi-
tionally omniscient, but not even factually omniscient. 
Omniscience Despite Ignorance of Tensed Facts 
It seems evident, then, that if God knows tensed facts, He is temporal, so that 
a denial of (5) is untenable. What prospect is there then for escaping the pre-
sent objection by a denial of (4)? Here it is not enough simply to assert that a 
timelessly existing being cannot be expected to know tensed facts, on the 
basis that this is to demand the logically impossible.23 Of course, such a feat 
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is logically impossible; that is the point of the necessary truth of (5). But so 
long as we retain the customary definition of omniscience 
0: 5 is omniscient = df For all p, if p, then 5 knows that p and 
does not believe that -p 
and agree that tense is part of the propositional content expressed by 
tensed sentences, then it follows that God, in order to be omniscient, must 
know tensed facts. If such knowledge is precluded by His timelessness, 
then He is not omniscient. 
The above suggests that the most promising strategy for the atemporal-
ist will be either to revise the traditional definition of omniscience or to 
deny that tense, though objective, belongs to the propositional content of 
tensed sentences. 
Generally speaking, the difficulty encountered in the first approach is 
that any adequate definition must be in accord with our intuitive under-
standing of the difiniendum, so that we are not at liberty to "cook" the defi-
nition of omniscience in order to resolve the difficulty without the defini-
tion's becoming unacceptably ad hOC.24 So what plausible alternative to 0 
does the atemporalist suggest? 
Wierenga, in a sort of second line of defense, is prepared to accept that 
some propositions are "perspectival," true at some perspectives and false 
at others. With respect to tense what this amounts to is the admission that 
propositions have their truth values relative to times and thus sometimes 
change their truth values. 0 would require God to know all such true 
propositions and, hence, to be temporal and changing. But Wierenga, 
observing that believing that a proposition is true at a perspective is differ-
ent from believing at a perspective that a proposition is true, proposes the 
following re-definition of omniscience:25 
0': X is omniscient = df For any proposition p and perspective 
<s,b, (i) if P is true at <s,b, then X 
knows that p is true at <s,t>, and 
(ii) if X is at <s,t> and p is true at <s,t>, 
then at <s,t>, X knows p. 
According to 0' God must know which tensed propositions are true at 
which times, but He need not know the tensed propositions themselves. 
Wierenga concludes, "if some propositions really do change their truth 
value over time, if propositions are thus 'perspectival,' then ... an omni-
scient being is required to know a perspectival proposition only if the 
being is at a perspective at which the proposition is true"; thus, "it follows 
from the claim that God is omniscient that he is not eternal only on the 
assumption that he is at some temporal perspective .... "26 
Wierenga's definition 0' is, however, unacceptably contrived. For the 
ostensibly perspectival nature of truth is not a sufficient condition for 
exempting knowledge of a certain class of propositions from the concept of 
omniscience. In Wierenga's view, God has knowledge of propositions stat-
ing exclusively tenseless B-facts, such as that p is true at t, whereas temporal 
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persons know a multitude of objectively true propositions which remain 
unknown to God. Persons located at t know not merely that p is true at t; 
they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of which God is 
ignorant. Wierenga re-defines omniscience in such a way that a being 
which does not know tensed propositions can nonetheless be declared to 
be omniscient. But in the absence of independent grounds for accepting 
0', such a procedure is unacceptably ad hoc. If we wish to include tempo-
ral perspectives in our definition of omniscience, then why not adopt 
Davis's following definition?27 
0": S is omniscient = df For all p, if pat t, then it is true at t that 
S knows that p and does not believe -po 
On 0", unlike 0', God would know every true proposition instead of just 
some; this intuitively commends 0' as a more adequate definition of 
omniscience.28 But 0" would require that God know tensed proposi-
tions, as (4) states. 
Leftow also entertains the idea that omniscience be re-defined in such a 
way that God not be required to know all truths, including tensed truthS.29 He 
argues, in effect, that there are plausibly many sorts of truths that God cannot 
know, so what harm is there in admitting one more class of truths of which 
God is ignorant? But Leftow's strategy is misconceived. This reasoning does 
not constitute grounds for revising the concept of omniscience as such (which 
does not even involve reference to God), but rather for denying that God need 
be omniscient. That is a moot question to which we shall return. 
A more plausible and independently motivated re-definition of omni-
science would be to deny that God's knowledge is propositional in nature 
and therefore not adequately described by 0, which gives a propositional 
account of omniscience.30 God's knowledge may be construed as a simple 
intuition of reality which we finite knowers represent to ourselves in terms 
of discrete propositions. If facts are propositional in nature (a fact being a 
true proposition," for example), then God could be said not to know facts 
as such, tensed or otherwise, though He is omniscient. 
But I think that such a re-construal, while plausible and attractive, does 
not serve to avert the force of the present objection. The critic of divine 
timelessness will simply re-formulate (4) in such a way that the problem 
re-appears, for example: 
4'. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows 
what we cognize as tensed facts. 
If God were ignorant of what we represent to ourselves propositionally as 
tensed facts, He would not deserve to be called omniscient. 
No good reason has been given, then, for revising the definition of 
omniscience in such a way that omniscience does not encompass knowl-
edge of (what we cognize as) tensed propositions. 
Suppose, then, that the atemporalist tries the other route to a denial of 
(4), maintaining that tense does not belong to the propositional content 
expressed by tensed sentences. Like personal and spatial indexicals, tempo-
236 Faith and Philosophy 
ral indexicals and tensed expressions could reflect features of the mode of 
presentation or the context of believing or the way of grasping the proposi-
tional content expressed by sentences containing such locutions. Or they 
could be analyzed in terms of our self-ascription of properties rather than, 
or in addition to, our believing propositions. Such analyses need not deny 
the objective reality of tense, but could simply exclude tense from the 
propositional content of tensed expressions, having it lodge somewhere 
else. Given the customary definition 0, a timeless God would count as 
omniscient, even given the necessary truth of (5), because there are no 
tensed facts, where facts and true propositions are extensionally equivalent. 
Again, it seems to me that such analyses are both attractive and plausible, 
but I doubt that they ultimately serve to avert the problem raised by the pre-
sent objection. If tense is an objective feature of reality, then one might plau-
sibly contend that there are non-propositional facts (for example, first-person 
facts) and that tensed facts are also among these. Since, according to 
Christian theism, God is not merely propositionally omniscient, but maxi-
mally excellent cognitively, He must know such tensed facts, just as He must 
possess non-propositional knowledge de se. His cognitive excellence would 
not require Him to possess everyone's knowledge de se, since it would be a 
cognitive defect for God to believe that He is Napoleon (not to mention His 
believing Himself also to be Washington and Reagan and ... ). Similarly, it 
would be a cognitive defect for God to believe that it is now 44 B.C. (not to 
mention His believing it also to be 1895 and 2020 and ... ). But it is a cogni-
tive perfection to have a knowledge of what time it really is, of what episode 
in the history of the actual world is present. A being who is ignorant of all 
tensed facts is less excellent cognitively than one who knows all such facts.3' 
The latter being knows infinitely more than the former and suffers no cogni-
tive defect in so doing. On the contrary, it is only by the grace of such knowl-
edge that God can act providentially in the temporal world at all.33 Hence, 
(4) can be reformulated as 
4*. If a temporal world exists, then if God is maximally excellent cog-
nitively, God knows tensed facts. 
With a similarly recast (2) the argument goes through as before. In case one 
still sticks at non-propositional facts, one may substitute in (4*) for "tensed 
facts" an expression like "what time it is" and revise (5) accordingly. 
In short, the prospects for turning back the force of (4) seem no better 
than those for denying (5). Given the existence of the temporal world, an 
omniscient or cognitively perfect being must know tensed facts. Since 
omniscience is essential to theism and such knowledge is incompatible 
with divine timelessness, God must not be timeless. 
Must God Be Omniscient? 
Our discussion has assumed the truth of 
2. God is omniscient, 
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but some defenders of divine timelessness, determined to preserve God's 
atemporality, are prepared to deny (2). Kvanvig, in response to the objec-
tion that "Just as we cannot hold the view that God is never intimately 
enough acquainted with himself to know himself as himself, so it would be 
a mark of imperfection were God never to be intimately acquainted with 
any temporal ... location," observes that there are two options open.34 
First, one could reject divine timelessness. In order to exhibit maximal per-
fection, God must directly grasp whatever moment is present and so be 
constantly changing. According to Kvanvig, the traditional motivations 
for the doctrine of timelessness are not compelling, so that it can be sacri-
ficed if found incompatible with omniscience or cognitive perfection.35 
Such a verdict goes down hard with Leftow, who advocates rejecting (2) 
rather than (1) if these are incompatible.36 He argues that God is ignorant of 
several classes of truth and that it is not a serious attenuation of divine 
omniscience to hold that He is also ignorant of tensed truths. It might be 
thought that we should construe God's knowledge as robustly as possible, 
so that even if there tum out to be some truths He cannot know, so that He 
is not omniscient, nevertheless that constitutes no justification for further 
eroding the extent of His knowledge by holding Him to be ignorant of 
tensed truths. But Leftow is so deeply committed to the doctrine of divine 
timelessness that he is prepared to jettison God's omniscience in order to 
preserve His timelessness. But does Leftow succeed in showing that God 
cannot know all true propositions? His example of something God cannot 
know is how it feels to be, oneself, a walker, a breather, or a sinner.37 But 
such knowledge is not propositional knowledge at all and so fails to furnish 
examples of truths which God does not know; hence, on 0 God is omni-
scient even though He does not know how it feels to be oneself a sinner. 
Leftow recognizes the non-propositional character of such knowledge, but 
insists that God's lacking such knowledge entails His ignorance of certain 
truths as well. If I arrange for a person to fail a test, I can say to him after-
wards, "Being a failure oneself feels like this." According to Leftow, 
This is a proposition we both grasp .... You and I can know that 
being a failure oneself feels like this, but if God cannot fail, God can-
not (though He can know how failure feels to you). For if God cannot 
fail, God cannot have the kind of experience "this" picks out and so 
in a sense cannot even understand the proposition that 'being a fail-
ure oneself feels like this.'3" 
It seems to me that the defender of God's omniscience will very plausi-
bly reply that "Being a failure oneself feels like this" is a sentence, not a 
proposition, as is evident from the presence of the demonstrative "this" 
(the italicizing of which does nothing to change its semantic content). 
Demonstratives serve to focus the hearer's attention on the referent and, 
like indexicals, are typically not construed to be part of the propositional 
content of the utterance involving them. The propositional content 
expressed by "this" in the example will be the feelings of humiliation, 
depression, and so forth that attend being oneself a failure. Leftow seems 
to think that because God cannot have such feelings, He cannot know the 
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propositional content expressed by the utterance. But this is to confuse 
God's ability to have the non-propositional knowledge of how it feels to be 
a failure oneself with His ability to know that being a failure oneself feels 
like being humiliated, and so forth. Even in LeHow's own example, the 
referent of "this" is not the speaker's own feelings, since he did not fail, but 
rather the other person's feelings who did fail. Yet Leftow asserts that they 
both know the same proposition. Similarly God can know the same 
propositional content that we do when we make such utterances, even 
though He does not share our experiences and so does not know how it 
feels to be oneself a failure. 
It might well be questioned whether preserving God's atemporality is 
worth the price of rendering Him ignorant of what state of the universe 
presently exists, as well as of all other tensed truths. But LeHow surmises 
that a God who is timeless but not omniscient with respect to tensed truths 
would be more perfect over all than a God who is temporal and possesses 
such knowledge. Leftow's many arguments for divine timelessness aim to 
extol the perfection accruing to God due to this attribute. Unfortunately, a 
discussion of these arguments takes us beyond the bounds of this paper. 
But I believe that all but one of his arguments can be shown to be unsound 
or inconclusive, as I have elsewhere tried to show.39 The greatness of 
divine temporality, on the other hand, can be seen in the fact that, if time is 
tensed, God could not be creatively active in the world were He timeless.40 
Leftow also attempts to cheapen the value of omniscience, arguing that 
it is not a necessary property of a perfect knower. He rightly points out 
that cognitive perfection involves many other qualities than the range of 
one's knowledge. But that does nothing to show that cognitive perfection 
should not also encompass knowledge of tensed facts. Leftow proceeds to 
attack the possibility of propositional omniscience, appealing to private 
propositions expressed by sentences containing first-person indexicals. 
But we have already seen how such knowledge de se can be handled non-
propositionally, not to mention the objections to private propositions.'! In 
any case, positing one restriction on the range of God's knowledge hardly 
makes it a matter of indifference whether further restrictions are proposed. 
The fact that propositional omniscience and maximal cognitive excellence 
have not been shown to be impossible undercuts Leftow's response to 
what he calls the semantic argument against divine timelessness. 
But what about Kvanvig's other alternative? He proposes that God be 
conceived to grasp all temporal moments directly.42 Such an understand-
ing, he claims, would be analogous to a plausible construal of omnipres-
ence as the direct grasping of the essence of every spatial location. What 
this analogy would imply, however, is that all times are literally present for 
God, not in the metaphorical sense of the eternal present, but in the literal 
temporal sense of the term. That is simply incompatible with there being a 
temporal series of events ordered by relations of earlier than/later than. In 
order to rebut this objection, K vanvig is forced to resort either to the device 
of ET -simultaneity of Stump and Kretzmann-which is explanatorily vacu-
ous43--or to the suggestion that omniscient beings can grasp essences of 
moments directly without being in time-which is both ad hoc and self-
contradictory.44 
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In conclusion, therefore, I think that we have good reason to believe that 
if a temporal world exists and an A-Theory of time is correct, then divine 
timelessness is incompatible with divine omniscience and, moreover, that 
if, as I claim, the arguments for God's atemporality are at best inconclusive, 
it is divine timelessness which ought to yield pride of place to divine omni-
science. 
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